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Successive government economic documents in Malta over the past 
twenty years consider the role of the local tax structure in 
terms of its contribution to stimulate personal initiative and 
encourage production, and to generate sufficient revenue for the 
State to finance at least the annual current expenditure. Yet, 
it is becoming common to read that local production is overbur-
dened with taxation and regulations. If this claim is correct it 
means that the tax policies currently implemented are defeating 
the Government's own set objectives. 
In this paper we comment on the theoretical relationships that 
exist between the tax structure and the two policy goals 
indicated and we assess the validity of the proposition that 
Malta is an overtaxed economy. No reference is made to non-tax 
factors, which are considered harmful for economic development. 
Taxation, Production and Tax Revenue 
The tax structure, the supply of effort (production), and tax 
revenue are interrelated. Tax revenue is simply the product of 
the tax rate times the tax base. Tax rate changes may be expect-
ed to affect aggregate supply; tax rate changes are relative 
price changes and they affect the choice between work and 
leisure, the allocation of resources, and real economic activity. 
As a result, they determine the tax base and, hence, the tax 
revenue. Changes in the tax structure must be seen as being 
totally distinct from, and sometimes negatively related to, 
changes in tax revenue. This line of argument has led to the 
explicit formulation of the relationship between tax rates and 
tax revenue in a mathematical function, now commonly referred to 
as the "Laffer Curve". This function has the general form: 
where 
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The Laffer tax rate - tax revenue relationship has several 
connotations. First, it suggests that there must exist a level 
and a structure of tax rates that minimize tax revenue. The 
precise level and structure of tax rates depend on the 
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elasticities of factors of production and output with respect to 
changes in tax rates. Secondly, the relationship implies that at 
all non-maximum tax levels, there exist two tax rates that will 
yield the same amount of revenue. Thirdly, the "Laffer Curve" 
implies that tax rate reductions can lead to either increases or 
decreases in tax revenue - depending on the location of the 
economy on the curve. In particular, if the economy is on the 
upper portion of the curve, a tax rate reduction will lead to a 
tax revenue increase. 
The relationships identified by the Laffer function are 
essentially of a long-term nature. Decisions related to the 
State's fiscal programme as a policy tool to induce long-term 
economic growth are, however, taken by politicians whose 
aspirations and needs often tend to be short-termed. 
Inconsistencies may therefore arise between the objectives of 
political leaders, whose time horizon spans only until the next 
election, and private investors who are primarily interested in 
the after-tax returns on current investment which usually span 
longer than the life of one Parliament. Politicians, seeking re-
election and the cash to provide benefits for voters, may be 
inclined to take advantage of taxpayers' inability to shift out 
of taxable income in the short run. If so, they would tend to 
maximise short-run revenue, positioning themselves on the peak of 
a "short-run Laffer Curve". The long-run effects of such 
policies would be a shortfall of capital accumulation from that 
desired which would yield lower outputs, income, employment and 
tax revenue for the Government in the future. The short-run 
proclivities of politicians may push taxpayers to the upper side 
of the "long-run Laffer Curve". 
It is a matter for empirical judgement to locate the economy on 
the "Laffer Curve" and in the process to estimate the rates of 
tax which maximise tax revenues for the State in the short and in 
the long run. It does not follow, of course, that governments 
should seek to maximise tax revenue by aiming for the peak of the 
"Laffer Curve" for in the process they would generate 
disincentive effects. Even if it is held that higher taxation 
compels people to work harder, it would not follow that 
government should raise taxation, since such a policy omits from 
consideration the value that people attach to leisure. 
Tax Revenues and Tax Rates In Malta 
The trends in the revenue from taxes on income and expenditure, 
(1) and the change in the index of the tax rate, expressed as the 
ratio of the aggregate tax revenue to the Gross Domestic Product, 
may be observed from the data in Table 1. Total tax revenue 
increased from Lm7 million to Lm113 million between 1960 and 1980 
while the index of the tax rate rose from 16.65% to 31.2% 
respectively. 
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Table 1 
Tax Revenue, Gross Domestic Product, and a General Index of Tax 
Rates: 1960. - 1980.. 
(1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) 
Year Taxes on Taxes on Total Tax GDP at Index of 
Income Expenditure Revenue Factor Tax Rate 
Cost (3) / (4) 
Lmo.o.o. Lmo.o.o. Lmo.o.o. Lmo.o.o. % 
1960. 1426 5199 1225 43399 16.65 
1961 1541 6832 8319 44521 18.82 
1962 1139 6610. 840.9 43190. 19.41 
1963 1462 6160. 8228 42620. 19.31 
1964 1990. 1220. 9210. 43534 21.15 
1965 1161 1412 9233 46681 19.18 
1966 2242 8463 10.10.5 5110.8 20..10. 
1961 2315 9380. 11695 55690. 21.0.0. 
1968 2115 10.888 13663 620.58 22.0.2 
1969 340.5 13329 16134 11181 23.31 
1910. 420.5 14828 18413 8220.1 22.39 
191i 5388 1520.8 20.596 8520.1 24.11 
1912 8681 14933 23620. 89646 26.34 
1913 14114 11445 31619 10.0.861 31.35 
1914 14266 18128 32994 118614 21.82 
1915 19869 20.0.0.2 39811 152944 26.0.1 
1916 22812 22832 4510.4 189448 24.12 
1911 28110. 26882 55592 219899 25.28 
1918 3590.6 30.116 660.22 251260. 26.28 
1919 51828 36159 81981 293651 29.96 
1980. 62890. 45144 10.8634 348612 31.16 
Source: National Accounts of the Maltese Islands (COS, Malta) 
Tables 4 and 1. 
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The observed differences in tax revenues and in the tax index 
between 1960 and 1980 are substantial, yet the data in Table 1 do 
not suggest that Malta is particularly heavily taxed by 
international standards. Studies on international tax 
comparisons indicate the existence of a progressive element in 
the international tax structure - richer countries pay 
proportionately more tax than the less well-orr. An OECD study 
(2) points out that in 1976 the tax index, as we defined it 
above, stood at 55% for Scandinavia, 50% for the Netherlands, 44% 
for France, 43% for Germany, 40% for the United Kingdom, 36% for 
Italy, 34% for Switzerland and 23% for Japan. 
Of course, such indices must be seen only as general, overall 
indicators of tax burdens in the respective economies and any 
conclusions drawn from them should be regarded primarily as 
indicators of general tendencies rather than of exact tax 
behaviour. Being summary statistics, these tax indices do not 
distinguish between the varied arrays of taxes and government 
commitments in the different countries. ThUS, for example, the 
data upon which the above indices are based include social 
security contributions. These differ between countries, but so 
do the related benefits that governments undertake to provide 
under the social welfare schemes. 
Moreover, the structure of taxation yields different degrees of 
tax progression which may be directly related, but need not be, 
to the level of the overall average rates of tax. For example, 
Japan has a low average rate of tax, but tax progressivity is 
high, while Germany has a high average rate of tax but compar-
atively low tax progressivity. (3) Besides, the extent of direct 
State intervention in production of goods and serVices, leading 
to the appropriation of profits, differs between countries, and 
over time within an economy. Consequently, public monopoly 
pricing that yields profits in excess of what may be considered a 
nnormal n rate of return in a particular industry would differ 
internationally and inter-temporally within a country. Although 
such profits would not be referred to officially as taxes, yet 
there is reason to consider them as such. If a monopoly were 
privately owned, excessive profits (supernormal profits) would 
fall under government scrutiny and would often be subjected to 
price control. As no such constraints probably inhibit pricing 
policies of State monopolies, excessive price charging by State 
corporations can be taken to represent, in part, a tax on 
expenditure. 
Finally, there is no one value of the index that can be 
considered as noptimal n . Indeed, anyone of the tax structures 
that yielded the indices observed above may be regarded 
detrimental to economic growth and personal initiative in a 
particular country. Thus, for instance, the Swedish tax system 
produces the highest tax index registered in the OECD study; yet 
it is seen by organizations in Sweden as a disincentive to 
nventure capital necessary to start small industries n. (4) This 
argument is evidently valid for other economies as well, 
espeCially those undergoing significant structural changes in 
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their patterns of production. 
In Malta the tax index was 24% in 1976; it compared favourably 
with the indices for Europe. Even if we allow for tax 
progression as per capita GNP rises, it seems that tax payers in 
Malta did not fare badly either. In an analysis based on the 
OECD data, Michael Beenstock plotted a linear function 
correlating the average tax rate and the GNP per head. (5) By 
extrapolating that function, we obtained a rate of tax of 26% 
correlated with a GNP per head of $1600 in 1976. (6) The rate 
obtained for Malta, 24%, was two pOints below the estimated 
average. If we assume that this tax function remained stable, at 
least for the period 1976 - 1980, then a tax index of 32% would 
correspond to a GNP per capita of $3760. (7) The tax ratio in 
Malta was 31.2%; this was sightly below the international 
average. 
Two conclusions follow immediately from these data. First, a 
shift occurred in the tax burden in Malta between 1976 and 1980: 
from two points below the OECD average, the tax ratio for Malta 
moved closer to the corresponding mean at the higher income per 
head. Secondly, if this type of displacement is ignored, it may 
be concluded that, judged from official tax data, the Maltese 
economy is behaving, taxwise, as expected to by international tax 
standards. This second conclusion, however, demands qualifi-
cation. Official tax statistics have to be critically examined 
for, in a sense, they are misleading. Tax data show the revenue 
collected in a given year but not the amount of tax due for that 
year. There is reason to suspect that tax statistics in Malta 
tend to understate the true amount ot tax revenue collected, 
besides failing to identify the amount of tax due. Furthermore, 
if the increases in tax rates encourage activity in the informal 
economy, the estimate of the GDP becomes distorted more than it 
is normally expected to be. The greater the volume of trans-
actions taking place "underground", the bigger the error in the 
estimated GDP; GDP would be undervalued. The true tax burden on 
that part of the population which indulges--in underground 
economic activity would consequently be lower than it should in 
fact be, and the tax burden, that is Tax paid (not due) / Estim-
ated GDP, based on official data tends to be inflated. 
This second issue is dynamic in nature and complex to resolve. 
To this writer's knowledge, no research has been carried out to 
da te on the "underground economy" in Mal ta. Therefore, for the 
rest of this paper comments are limited to problems of 
interpretation and omission related to the tax statistics. This 
entire matter will need to be reassessed when estimates on the 
value of activity taking place in the informal sector in Malta 
become available. 
Official Tax Data in Malta: Omissions and Lags 
Personal Income Tax statistics refer to the revenue received by 
the Tax authorities in a year. Before the introduction of the 
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PAYE system, these payments could be backdated by several years. 
Indeed, the attempts to estimate an Income Tax function for the 
economy suggest that there exists a closer relationship between 
the tax revenue in a given year and economic activity three years 
before than tax revenue and economic activity in anyone year. 
This result is illustrated by equation (1) which supports the 
resul ts 0 btained by other wri ters. (8) 
T(Pj -3.78 + 0.1142 Y(P) 
t-3 
(13.13) 
-2 
R 0.991 F = .1067.34 
) t Statistics 
+ 0.0755 DY(P) 
t-3 
(14.52 ) 
D.W. 1.500 n 20 
where T (P) Income Tax revenue, in current Prices 
Y (P) Personal Income, in current Prices 
D 0 (1957 - 1972) 
1 (1973 - 1976) 
Equation (1) accounts for the introduction of the PAYE system in 
1973; the marginal rate of tax rises by 7% following the switch 
in the method of tax collection compared to what it was under the 
former system. The PAYE tax collection must have contributed 
towards the elimination of the observed time gap between tax 
revenue and economic activity, but even by 1979 about Lm15 
million were still being claimed by the Inland Revenue Department 
despite the fact that tax arrears were being called in at the 
rate of Lm800,000 per month. (9) For these reasons a 
redistribution of personal income tax receipts would be necessary 
before the "correct" tax burden for anyone year could be 
established. Such a redistribution, however, remains 
conjectural; the suspension of the publication of detailed 
reports by the Inland Revenue Department for the years post-1967 
renders an actual redistribution - one which conforms to the real 
spread of taxes paid - unfeasible. 
In addition, there also appear to exist wide divergencies between 
the annual imputed values for company tax and the actual tax paid 
(Table 2). It is observed from Table 2 that effected company tax 
payments differ markedly from the imputed tax due especially 
during the period 1976 - 1979; these differences are presently an 
issue of controversy between the local Tax Authorities and the 
business sector. (10) It seems that official company tax statis-
tics understate the tax due for anyone year. 
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Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Table 2 
Corporate Taxes Paid and Imputed Corporate Taxes 
(1 ) 
Corporate 
Taxes 
1934 
2041 
2425 
2680 
2273 
3064 
4089 
4972 
7142 
10705 
10260 
1970 - 1980 
(2 ) 
Imputed 
Corporate 
Taxes 
3272 
2829 
3316 
3825 
5279 
9007 
11729 
13817 
14701 
16091 
18477 
LmOOO 
(3 ) 
Difference 
(2) - (1) 
1338 
888 
881 
1145 
3006 
5943 
7640 
8845 
7559 
5386 
8217 
Source: Column (1): National Accounts of the Maltese Islands, 
Table 3. 
Column (2): Estimated as 0.325 (Corporate Profits Net of 
Deprecia tion ) 
Furthermore, the data on the Taxes on Expenditure also 
underdeclare the revenue which government raises from this 
source. They exclude the levies which government introduced on a 
wide variety of commodities as part of a scheme, the Price 
Stabilisation Scheme, set up in 1979 with the aim of stabilising 
over time the prices of certain basic commodities, such as bread, 
meat and sugar. Also excluded is the revenue from taxes on 
petroleum products. 
Information on the financial state of the Price Stabilisation 
Fund is very scanty. It is limited to statements by government 
ministers on the amount of subsidies allocated to particular 
products during a fiscal year but no reference has, to date, been 
made to the total annual yield of this levy on commodities nor to 
the contribution for the Fund by the individual items upon which 
the "surcharge" is raised. The proceeds from taxes and monopoly 
profits on petrochemical goods appear as net gain for Enemalta, 
the State Corporation authorised to import and distribute petrol-
eum products in Malta. In 1980, Government spent Lm2 million in 
subsidies on various commodities under the Price Stabilisation 
Scheme: it was, however, claimed by Government that the Fund had 
a further Lm6 million in reserve. (11) These funds must have 
accrued during 1979 and 1980; they represent a yearly average of 
Lm4 million in levies on commodities. 
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The profits of Enemalta from the sale of petroleum products were 
Lm1.5m, Lm1.9m, and Lm9m respectively during financial years 1977 
- 78, 1978 - 1979, and 1979 - 1980. The Corporation's profit for 
1979 could be tentatively set at Lm3.67m. (12) Of course, our 
prime interest is not in the profits of Enemalta, but on the 
revenue transferred ro-Government, representing the proceeds from 
taxes on the sale of petroleum products and the revenue which 
accrues as a direct result of Enemalta's monopoly on the sale of 
such products~ No details on the revenues arising from the tax 
cum monopoly profit are available; we propose, therefore, to 
consider the total profit on petroleum goods as a levy. 
The proposed procedure will evidently inflate the revenue that 
arises from petroleum, but not necessarily the total tax revenue; 
the additional income can be taken to compensate for another 
unidentified amount of revenue raised as a levy on savings. This 
levy arises as a result of the implementation of the joint 
policies of controls on the export of foreign currency under the 
Exchange Controls Act and the relatively low interest rates paid 
by the Commercial Banks in Malta. Before the concession was 
withdrawn in Novembe~ 1982, individuals could send abroad up to 
Lm500 annually; any excess of savings would presumably be 
deposited with the local banks which up to 1981 paid a maximum 5% 
interest on time deposits; presently they pay 6%. Banks, in 
turn, deposited their surplus cash with the Central Bank which 
invested the funds abroad at higher rates of return than those 
paid locally to depositors. The levy on savings is equal to the 
difference between two values of disposable income: that which 
would have accrued had a Maltese invested abroad the funds he or 
she desired, and the disposable income that arise as a direct 
result of the implementation of policies on exchange control and 
a ceiling on local interest rates. (13) 
Aggregate tax revenue, which includes the proceeds from the 
Stabilisation Fund and petroleum products, would now amount to 
Lm95.657m in 1979 and Lm117.384m in 1980; the index of the tax 
rate becomes 32.58% and 33.7% respectively for those two years. 
The inclusion of these taxes on consumption has the effect of 
raising the average rate of tax for Malta from two pOints below 
the expected tax index in 1976 to 1.7 pOints above in 1980, when 
due allowance is made for tax progression. It now follows that 
taxation is not behaving as it is expected if we simply consider 
the amount or-fax funds collected through time. One thing is 
certain; the sources of tax finance in Malta are getting more 
diversified while detailed information on the respective yields 
is not matching the spread. Such statistical data are essential 
for a critical evaluation of the tax system in terms of the 
public policy objectives it aims to achieve. And only Government 
can provide them. (14) 
Is Mal ta Overtaxed? 
Does the preceding discussion suggest that Malta is an overtaxed 
economy? The answer depends on how the term "overtaxation" is 
48 
defined. If "overtaxation" is defined relative to the average 
rate of tax correlated to GNP per capita, as estimated from a 
function based on intercountry data on taxes and output per head, 
then it can be maintained that in 1980 economic activity in Malta 
was overtaxed whereas in 1976 it was not. In this instance, the 
objective of rendering of the tax structure a stimulus to 
personal initiative in the formal economy is not presently being 
achieved. It follows that reconsideration of this policy tool 
becomes imperative. 
If "overtaxation" is defined in relation to that rate of tax 
which maximises revenue for the State, estimated at the peak of 
the "Laffer Curve" then it can be held that the economy has not 
yet reached tne maximum it can bear, and consequently, it is not 
overtaxed. Table 1 above suggests that revenue from taxation 
kept on increasing in line with the rise in the tax index. With 
the exception of the short period between 1970 and 1976, (when 
revenue kept rising while the tax ratio increased from 22.39% 
(1970) to a maximum 31.35% (1973) and then fell again to 24.12 
(1976), after which the index kept on rising) it is seen that the 
tax rate index and tax revenue are positively related and upward 
moving. In terms of the "Laffer Curve", this means that the 
economy is still on the lower segment; it follows that a rise in 
the tax rates would yield further additional revenues. However, 
it is not yet possible to estimate the potential taxable capacity 
of the Maltese economy for two reasons: first, the estimate of a 
quadratic function yields a minimum rate as expected from the 
data, and not a maximum rate as specified by the Laffer Curve; 
secondly, there has occurred a steady erosion in the real 
disposable income of most employees over the seventies with the 
result that activity in the underground economy - through a 
second job undeclared for tax purposes, for example - is not only 
encouraged but increasingly becoming unavoidable especially for 
the lowest income groups. 
A quadratic equation fitted to the data 
spanning the period 1960 to 1980, gives the 
2 
REV = 24.53 - 4.869 T + 0.209 T 
(0.556) (1.875)* 
in Table above, 
following result: 
2 
R 0.6414 F= 17.0 
(15 ) 
D.W. 0.4587 n 21 
* significant at the 95% C.L. 
Equation ~2) gives us a minimum rate of tax, which is not of 
interest in the present analysis; revenue keeps rising as the tax 
rate increases. 
It should not be inferred that because the economy seems to be 
situated on the lower segment of the "Laffer Curve", taxation may 
be pushed up indiscriminately. The share of total domestic 
resources channelled to the State rose from 24% in 1976 to an 
estimated 33.7% in 1980, an increase of ten percentage points 
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within four years. At the same time, the net effect of the 
changes introduced in the personal income tax structure, the 
increase in the rates of welfare payment allowances per child 
for the first three, and the upward movements of the general 
retail price level - influenced to a significant extent by 
government's policy on public pricing and taxing of consumer 
goods, including basic food items - have resulted in a fall in 
the real disposable income for most income groups, even those in 
the low income categories. Illustrations of this erosion in the 
purchasing power for wage-earners in income brackets that cannot 
be considered in the "well-off" region are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 1 
(a) 
Disposable Income, in Money Terms (Lm) 
Class I 
Class 11 
Class III 
Class I 
Class 11 
Class III 
Class I 
Class 11 
Class III 
Class I 
Class II 
Class III 
1976 
708 
1158 
1563 
Single Person 
1977 
784 
1219 
1624 
1978 
902 
1331 
1736 
Married Couple with 1 children 
838.9 
1415.3 
1881.1 
1012.1 
1862.4 
1997.8 
(b) 
1176.1 
1710.1 
2138.0 
Dis posa ble Income in Real Terms (Lm) 
647 
1058 
1429 
651 
1013 
1349 
716 
1056 
1377 
Married Couple with 1 children 
767 
1294 
1719 
841 
1298 
1660 
933 
1357 
1696 
Retail Price Index: (1974 100) 
109.41 120.36 126.04 
1979 
984 
1384 
1789 
1277.7 
1795.7 
2215.5 
729 
1025 
1325 
946 
1330 
1641 
135.04 
NOTE: Class I 
Class 11 
Class III 
Minimum Wage Government Employee 
Class I + Lm600 
Class I + Lm 1200 
1980 
1163 
1619 
2059 
1543.8 
2022.3 
2467.8 
744 
1036 
1317 
988 
1294 
1579 
156.33 
Disposable Income (MC) = Wages + Bonus + (Children's Allowances) -
(National Insurance Contributions + Income Tax) 
Disposable Income (Single Person) 
Wages + Bonus - (National Insurance Contributions 
+ Income Ta x) 
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Any income in excess of that of the Class I employee for a person 
who is not married, and any income higher than that for a Class 
11 employee married with 3 children, registers a fall in the real 
disposable income in 1980 compared to 1976. Moreover, it is 
observed that even for the Class I employee, the level of the 
real purchasing power has practically flattened out after 1978. 
These impressions emerge directly from the analysis of official 
data. One must note, however, that the Interim Index of Retail 
Prices was structured in the early seventies. Since then, prices 
the world over have been rising, on average, sharp and fast; it 
may be hypothesized that such price movements could have induced 
shifts in the composition of local demand between "vital" and 
"non-vital" consumer items and possibly even between items 
pertaining to each of these categories. Unfortunately, any 
shifts that might have occurred over the seventies cannot be 
identified for all the Maltese households; the statistical base 
on which information has been collected refers to low income 
brackets, while the survey population upon which the Retail Price 
Index for the 1980's wil be constructed is restricted to 
employees whose income did not exceed Lm2000 in 1980. The 
consumption patterns of the self-employed, pensioners and all 
wage and salary earners whose income exceeded Lm2000 in 1980 are 
not assessed in the Budgetary Survey. The Price Index eventually 
constructed will effectively reveal the effects on consumption of 
price changes on employees in the "low" income brackets only.(16) 
It would have been useful if information on the changes in the 
real disposable income of workers in the higher income brackets -
those pertaining to the higher supervisory and top managerial 
positions - were also known. While all should be enticed to work 
more industriously and intelligently, (17) the initiative of some 
groups happens to be more critical than that of others in the 
sense that weak co-ordination, or lack of vision in planning, 
would lead to a waste of efforts and resources. It is these 
unifying elements in production and sales that should not be 
ignored by public policy makers. Unfortunately, information on 
the consumption patterns of the workers undertaking such respons-
ibilities remains non-existent in Malta. 
The aspirations of workers and investors simply cannot be 
relegated to a secondary position because it is through their 
joint efforts that the socio-economic objectives laid down in 
Government's economic programmes can be achieved. It is often 
forgotten in practice by public policy makers that the micro-
foundations of macro-economic goals can only be ignored at a 
heavy future cost in output, employment, social stability and, as 
a consequence, human welfare. In the absence of studies on the 
attitudes of the Maltese towards tax-financed government 
programmes, we may assess, in a very general manner, the net 
effects of the fiscal and general government policies over the 
past years through the changes observed in the investment/total 
domestic output ratio. (18) The share of resources allocated for 
capital accumulation out of the gross domestic product fell from 
about 19% in the four years preceding 1977, to 15% in 1980 (Table 
52 
4). This rather sharp fall occurred over the same time period 
which registered a rapid rise in taxation, both explicit or 
disguised under a different name such as the Price Stabilization 
Fund. The 15% investment/output coefficient observed for 1980 
falls grossly short of the 25% - 30% considered by government as 
a necessary condition for the attainment of the economic targets 
set in the present five-year development plan. 
Year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Table 4 
Investment, Gross Domestic Product at Constant 1973 Prices 
Lm million) 
Gross Domestic Product Investment Investment 
~
115.8 22.3 19.3 
127.3 24.2 19.0 
152.2 27 .4 18.0 
178.1 34.1 19.2 
199.8 36.4 18.2 
222.1 35.2 15.8 
245.4 39.2 16.0 
262.7 39.5 15.0 
Source: National Accounts of the Maltese Islands (COS), Table B. 
It may be tentatively suggested that the Maltese economy may be 
positioning itself on a point on the positive slope of a 
short run Laffer Curve, which point, however, exceeds the peak of 
the long run Laffer Curve for Malta. A critical appraisal of 
government programmes on taxes and welfare, investment, state 
involvement in directly productive activities, and positive 
personal participation at all levels of decision making in firms 
and in SOCiety, is more than timely; it is urgently needed if the 
goal of increasing personal commitment in the economy is to be 
eventually attained. 
In summary, the yield from taxation in Malta has risen signifi-
cantly since 1976. It is estimated that, when allowance is made 
for tax progressivity, the average rate of general taxation 
shifted from 2 percentage points below to 2 points above the 
statistically expected level. Using the "tax - index - GNP per 
capita" relationship as a yardstick, it can be held that in 1980 
the Maltese economy was overtaxed. 
The "Laffer Curve" approach, however, appears to be of little 
help for positive policy formation in Malta for the time being. 
But judging from official tax data it may be suggested that the 
Maltese economy lies on the lower segment of a "Laffer Curve"; 
Malta may be heavily taxed but not overtaxed. However the scope 
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for "beneficial" tax increases, ones that stimulate output and 
tax revenue by generating effort in the "formal" economy, seems 
to be limited. It was demonstrated that there has occurred a 
steady erosion of real disposable income for income groups in the 
Lm2000 bracket, and even in the case of minimum wage earners, 
whether single or married, the gain in real terms of fiscal 
changes since 1978 was practically negligible. The scope for 
activity in the "informal" economy is, to this extent, corres-
pondingly greater now than it was five years ago. 
Furthermore, it was observed that the share of investment in the 
real domestic product fell to a low 15% in 1980; this coefficient 
represents only one half of the maximum 30% considered necessary 
by government to achieve the targets for output and employmen' 
set in the 1981 - 1985 development programme. It was, therefore 
suggested that the economy may be close to the peak of a "short-
run Laffer Curve" which is higher than the peak of a "long-run 
Laffer Curve" for Mal ta. 
Detailed published information on the yields in taxes from all 
sources is necessary for a proper analysis of the fiscal system 
in Malta. The failure to publish such data is rendering 
impossible critical research on public policy issues related to 
general taxation. 
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Notes 
(1) Taxes on Income include Personal Income Tax, Death and 
Donation Duties, Company Tax and Social Security 
Contributions. Taxes on Expenditure include Customs and 
Excise Duties, and Licence fees. 
(2) Sawyer (1976). 
(3) Tachibanaki (1981). 
(4) "The Challenge of Innovation in Industry", EFTA Bulletin, 
(EFTA, Geneva), May 1981. ----
(5) Beenstock (1979), p. 4. 
(6) Gross National Income per capita in Malta was Lm680.62 in 
1976. The exchange rate of the Maltese lira in terms of 
U.S. dollar was 2.344 at the end of 1976. 
(7 ) Income per head was Lm1333 in 1980. 
$2.8237 at the end of 1980. 
The Lm was worth 
(8) Metwally (1977), pp. 113 - 116. 
(9) Report of the Department of Inland Revenue, Malta, April -
December, 1979. 
(10) Delia (1981), p. 62. 
(11) This statistic was given by the Prime Minister in Parlia-
ment during the debate on the Government's Budget for 1981. 
The Fund was expected to finance subsidies worth Lm2.45 
million in 1981; this was reported in Parliament by the 
Minister of Finance when he presented the Budget for 1982. 
(12) Lm3.67m 0.75 (Lm1.9m) + 0.25 (Lm9m) representing nine 
months profit. for 1978 - 79, and three months profit for 
financial year 1979 - 80. The profit for the first 9 
months of 1980 amounts to Lm6.75m. 
(13) The loss of revenue accruing to the investor, pre-tax, 
amounts to (r - r ) where 
f d 
rf interest rate paid abroad, in Maltese lira. 
rd = interest rate in Malta. 
The net difference, however, equals (l-t)rf - (l-t)rd, 
post-tax income in both cases. 
(14) One writer has recently observed that the termination of 
detailed reports by Government Departments could be due 
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"partly to lack of modern data-processing equipment and 
partly to the desira to curtail expenditure on research, 
statistics and publication. In a small developing country 
these may be unavoidable limitations. There ~ however, 
be ~ desire to discoura~e discussion of some policy issues 
involved". Kaim Caudle 1981) p. 17 (underlying adde~ 
(15) The estimated function overestimates the annual tax revenue 
for the period 1962 - 75; it underestimates it for the 
period 1976 - 80. 
(16) Delia (1981), pp. 27 - 29. 
(17) Hard work is necessary but not sufficient for productivity 
increases; better organized work is essential. 
(18) Delia (1982). 
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